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PRESERVING REAL ESTATE CONTRACT FINANCING
IN WASINGTON: RESISTING THE PRESSURE TO
ELIMINATE FORFEITURE
Thomas Leo McKeirnan
Abstract. There is pressure in Washington to abolish the forfeiture remedy from real estate
contracts. Eliminating forfeiture would cripple the real estate contract and thus provide a
disincentive for sellers to finance sales of their property. This result would be economically
unsound and in conflict with the public policy in favor of promoting home ownership.
Instead of abolishing forfeiture, the Washington State Legislature should amend current
legislation to provide a more sensible and certain forfeiture remedy.

A owns property that B is eager to purchase. A would prefer to
receivefull paymentfor the property on the closing date of the sale. B is
unable to obtain bank financingfor one or more of several possible
reasons: he is a poor credit risk; he has insufficientfunds for a down
payment; he is unwilling to make the required down payment; or the
bank is unwilling to take the proposed property as security. In the
absence of other buyers who can pay cash for the property or obtain
third-partyfinancing,A must choose to finance the transactionwith B or
take the property off the market. A is unwilling to finance B "spurchase
of the property unless B agrees to conditions that will substantiallylower
A's financial risk To avoid the financial burdens associated with
exercising a remedy under mortgage or deed of trust law, A determines
that the only way to reduce the risk is to require B to forfeit all rights
and claims to the property if B defaults on the loan. IfB will agree to a
forfeiture remedy, A will accept installment payments with interest in
lieu of cash. B agrees to the forfeiture provision and the sale is
completed.

The common forfeiture provision is contained in a real property
security device known in Washington as a real estate contract.' This
Comment suggests an approach that would bolster the forfeiture remedy
and thus preserve real estate contract financing in Washington. First, the
Comment distinguishes real estate contracts from other real property
security devices and discusses limitations that have been placed on real
estate contract forfeiture in Washington and elsewhere. It then reveals
1. This security device is also known as an "installment land contract," "contract for deed," or
"long-term land contract." Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Real EstateFinanceLaw § 3.26, at
68 (3d ed. 1993).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 70:227, 1995

indications that the forfeiture remedy may be eliminated, in Washington.
Finally, it examines the legal, economic, and policy reasons for
encouraging the enforcement of real estate contract forfeitures and
proposes specific amendments to strengthen the Real Estate Contract
Forfeiture Act.
I.

REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS AS ALTERNATIVES TO
TRADITIONAL FINANCING DEVICES

The predominant device used to secure a real property loan in the
United States is the mortgage. Generally, a lender can realize on
mortgage-secured property in the event of a default only through judicial
foreclosure, a long, burdensome, and costly transaction.:' In Washington
today, land is more commonly mortgaged by the statutory deed of trust,3
a less costly and burdensome device than the straight mortgage. The
deed of trust is ordinarily more attractive to the lender because its
foreclosure requires no judicial intervention.4
The real estate contract is the most widely used alternative to the
mortgage and deed of trust.' In the real estate contract's most basic
2. Nelson & Whitman describe mortgage foreclosure as follows:
A typical action in equity to foreclose and sell involves a long series of steps: a preliminary title
search to determine all parties in interest; filing of the foreclosure bill of complaint and lis
pendens notice; service of process; a hearing, usually by a master in chancery who then reports
to the court; the decree or judgment; notice of sale; actual sale and issuance: of certificate of sale;
report of the sale; proceedings for determination of the right to any surplus; possible
redemptions from foreclosure sale; and the entry of a decree for a deficiency.
Id. § 7.11, at 491-92. Obviously, the costs of these steps can be prohibitive, Moreover, the various
parties' rights to re-acquire the property through redemption create so much uncertainty that there is
little incentive for potential bidders to even attend the sale. For example, the right to redemption in
Washington generally lasts eight months but can extend as long as a year. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 6.23.020(1) (1994).
3. The deed of trust is a form of mortgage with a "power of sale" in a thitd-party trustee. Nelson
& Whitman, supra note 1, § 1.6, at 11. On default, the third-party trustee sells the property in a
public sale. Id. § 7.19, at 513. The third-party trustee then distributes the proceeds to the various
parties in order of priority.
4. The purpose of a deed of trust statute is to "avoid time-consuming judicial foreclosure
proceedings and to save substantial time and money to both the buyer and the lender." Peoples Nat'l
Bank of Washington v. Ostrander, 6 Wash. App. 28, 31,491 P.2d 1058, 1060 (1971). In addition to
eliminating burdensome procedures, the Washington deed of trust statute gives sellers the added
advantage of no redemption after a valid sale. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.24.050 (1994). An actual deed
of trust foreclosure can take as little as 190 days. See timeline in Wash. Stata Bar Ass'n, Washington
Real PropertyDeskbook § 49.21 (2d ed. 1986). However, the lender's procedural advantages are
offset by the fact that he usually cannot proceed against the mortgagor individually for a deficiency.
Wash. Rev. Code § 61.24.100 (1994).
5. Nelson & Whitman, supranote 1, § 3.26, at 68.

Real Estate Contract Forfeiture
form, the seller and purchaser sign a contract in which the seller, like a
purchase-money mortgagee, agrees to accept installment payments of
principal and interest for part of the purchase price. Unlike a mortgagee,
however, the seller retains legal title to the property until all the
contractual obligations are fulfilled. These obligations are similar to
those found in mortgage and deed of trust financing and, at minimum,
normally include timely payments of all principal and interest, payment
of insurance and taxes, upkeep and repair of the property, and a duty not
to commit waste.
The distinguishing feature of the real estate contract is the standard
provision allowing a forfeiture remedy in case of default. Upon default,
this provision gives the seller the right to reclaim all rights to the
property in question and retain all amounts paid on the contract and any
improvements made to the property by the buyer up to the point of the
6
forfeiture.
The sweeping consequences of this remedy to the purchaser can create
the perception in an extreme case that forfeiture is unfairly harsh. Some
Washington courts have taken this position by citing the maxim "equity
abhors a forfeiture," 7 and denying forfeiture. Indeed, it is not impossible
to imagine a case in which forfeiture might be harsh. Theoretically, a
purchaser who buys a home on a twenty-year real estate contract,
substantially complies with all the obligations of the contract for nineteen
years, and then misses one or two payments can be forced to forfeit the
contract and surrender all claims and rights to the property. In this
situation, the purchaser would have paid off almost all of the debt, may
have spent considerable amounts of money improving the home, and
probably would have gained a substantial increase in the market value of
the property.
It is true that a standard real estate contract provides no possibility of
compensation for the value of the buyer's accrued equity.8 The seller
retains the amounts paid on the contract, the improvements, and the

6. See, e.g., Form Real Estate Contract in Washington Real Property Deskbook, supra note 4,
§ 47.37, at 47-56.
7. See, e.g., Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wash. 2d 246, 252, 173 P.2d 977, 979 (1946); cf. Sleeper v.
Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 567-68, 88 P. 1036, 1038 (1907) (stating the maxim, but enforcing
forfeiture under the equitable rule that contracts will be enforced as made and in accordance with the
acts of the parties thereunder).
8. Equity is defined as the remaining interest belonging to one who has pledged or mortgaged his
property, the surplus of value which may remain after the property has been disposed of for the
satisfaction of liens, or the amount or value of a property above the total liens or charges. Black's
Law Dictionary374 (Abr. 6th ed. 1991).
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increased value of the property. Mortgagors in the position of the
hypothetical defaulting real estate contract buyer discussed above would
likely have been compensated for the value of their equity through the
judicial foreclosure process. Many mortgagors in default, however, are
in no better position than a real estate contract purchaser. In a mortgage
or deed of trust default, there is a public sale from which the mortgagor
is entitled to the amount in excess of the funds required to meet the
remaining obligations on the loan plus the mortgagee's costs.
Mortgagees will commonly bid only this amount at a public sale. Thirdparty buyers, on the other hand, will enter bids only if there is enough
equity in the property to yield a profitable return. Hence, only defaulting
mortgagors with substantial equity will ever receive any compensation
upon default.
Because of perceived harsh results, courts and legislatures throughout
the country have limited the right to forfeiture,9 either through common
law or by statute. These limitations are often closely analogous to
mortgage and deed of trust debtor protections and range from the
complete disallowance of forfeitures to the requirement that sellers
comply with minimal procedural requirements before forfeitures become
final.
II.

LIMITATIONS ON REAL ESTATE CONTRACT FORFEITURE

Traditionally, the common law governed the enforcement of standard
forfeiture clauses. Since earlier jurists emphasized the contractual nature
of the real estate contract, forfeiture clauses were customarily enforced to
carry out the intent of the parties,'0 even when buyers stood to lose
substantial amounts.
But as time passed, more judges became
concerned with inequity in the enforcement of forfeiture clauses and
placed increased limitations on their use. Some state legislatures also
supported this trend and adopted statutes that govern the use of
forfeiture.
As one might expect, these efforts have not been
implemented in a uniform manner. As a result, the law in this field is not
subject to orderly description."

9. See infra part II.A-B.
10. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
11. Nelson & Whitman, supranote 1, § 3.27, at 69.
12. Id. at 70.

Real Estate Contract Forfeiture
A.

JudicialLimitations on Forfeiture

Judges control the enforcement of forfeiture clauses through equitable
power, relieving buyers from forfeiture to prevent any result that would
be inequitable, unjust, or shocking to the court's conscience. 13 Upon
determining that enforcing a forfeiture would be inequitable, a court
employs various remedial techniques. Many courts set a date by which a
defaulting buyer may pay the amount remaining on a contract and
redeem the land from forfeiture.14 While some courts view this right as
unconditional, other courts allow it only when the buyer has a substantial
amount of equity in the property or when there has been no bad faith on
the buyer's part. 5 Common law courts in Washington often allowed this
"grace period"
in which the buyer could pay the remaining balance of the
6
contract.
In addition to a grace period, most states require the seller to give the
buyer advance notice of an intent to declare a forfeiture. 7 California and
a few other states allow forfeiture, but condition it upon the seller's
restitution to the buyer of any amount that exceeds the actual damages."
In such a state, the court must determine the value of the buyer's equity
and the actual damages to the seller-a process which can require
expensive litigation.
One state supreme court has employed a "convertibility" approach to
forfeiture clauses. In Skendzel v. Marshall, the Indiana Supreme Court
held that a forfeiture clause was "clearly excessive" and "unreasonable,"
as the vendee had already paid $21,000 of a $36,000 contract price."
Although the Skendzel court forced the seller to judicially foreclose the
contract, it did not completely eliminate the forfeiture remedy. Rather,
the court merely limited forfeiture to situations where the buyer
abandons or absconds with the property or has paid only a minimum
amount and wants to stay in possession while the seller is paying
13. 7 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property 938.22[6], at 84D-59 (Patrick J. Rohan ed.
1993).
14. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, § 3.29, at 77. Some courts will allow the buyer to merely
pay the arrearages to reinstate the contract. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wash. 2d 246, 252, 173 P.2d 977, 980 (1946); Zane v. Hinds, 136
Wash. 352, 357, 240 P. 6, 8 (1925); Rohlinger v. Coletta Land & Orchard Co., 64 Wash. 348, 353,
116 P. 1095, 1097 (1911).
17. See 7 Powell, supranote 13, 938.22[5], at 84D-56-84D-57.
18. See Nelson & Whitman, supranote 1, § 3.29, at 84-85 & n.32, at 82.
19. 301 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ind. 1973), cert. denied,415 U.S. 921 (1974).
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property maintenance costs.2"
This is considered a "convertible"
approach because the Skendzel court determined that at a certain point
the equities were such that the only fair remedy was to require judicial
foreclosure.2 The point of conversion is not clearly defined in the
decision. Indiana courts have subsequently applied the stated limitations
very narrowly, making judicial foreclosure the only alternative in most
22
cases.

The Kentucky Supreme Court is the only state supreme court that has
unequivocally eliminated the forfeiture remedy from real estate
contracts.' In the sweeping decision of Sebastian v. Flyd,24 it held that
the only remedy available to a seller on default of a real estate contract is
judicial foreclosure.25 Some commentators believe that the Kentucky
decision is a natural result of the judicial trend of limiting forfeitures and
portends a wave of similar decisions. 26 However, because there have
been no similar decisions since the Kentucky Supreme CDurt's holding in
1979, it is doubtful that forfeiture will be judicially eliminated anytime
soon. In most states, the law remains that forfeiture is 2generally subject
only to an equitable grace period in an appropriate case. '
B.

Statutory Limitations on Forfeiture

Several states have dealt with the perceived harshness of real estate
contract forfeitures by statute. The most sweeping and decisive statute to
date is Oklahoma's, which, like Sebastian v. Floyd, eliminates the
remedy of forfeiture from real estate contracts by providing that "[real
estate contracts] shall to that extent be deemed and held mortgages, and
shall be subject to the same rules of foreclosure and to the same
regulations, restraints and forms as are prescribed in relation to
mortgages."2

20. Id. at 650.
21. See 7 Powell, supra note 13, 938.22[6], at 84D-62.
22. Id. 938.22[6], at 84D-61; Nelson & Whitman, supranote 1, § 3.29, al 88.
23. One state appellate court has also clearly eliminated the forfeiture ra-medy from real estate
contracts. See White v. Brousseau, 566 So. 2d 832, 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
real estate contract should be foreclosed judicially).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979).
Id. at 384.
See, e.g., Nelson & Whitman, supranote 1, § 3.29, at 89-90.
See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
Okla. Stat. Ann. fit. 16, § I IA (West 1986).
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Oklahoma's statute is the only legislative resolution to the real estate
contract forfeiture problem that totally eliminates forfeiture. Most states
have enacted less sweeping statutes that govern forfeitures through
procedural requirements. For example, Iowa, North Dakota, Minnesota,
and Arizona have statutes that allow forfeiture of a contract if a seller
gives written notice to the purchaser and other persons in interest and
waits a required grace period in which the purchaser or other person
holding an interest in the property may cure the default.29 In Arizona and
Minnesota, the length of the grace period depends on the percentage of
the contract price the vendee has paid prior to default.30
Some state statutes take a more substantive approach in governing
forfeitures. For example, Maryland's statute does not allow forfeitures
on residences of non-corporate purchasers." Ohio's statute, on the other
hand, looks first to whether the property in question has been improved
by a dwelling.32 If so, the real estate must be judicially foreclosed unless
the contract has been in effect less than five years or less than twenty
percent of the principal amount of the contract has been paid.33 This is a
statutory version of the judicial "convertibility" approach mentioned
above.34
C.

The Uniform Land Security InterestAct

Some commentators conclude that the best way to deal with the
differences in real property security realization is to abandon the existing
system altogether and replace it with a comprehensive statute covering
all devices." In 1985, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Land Security Interest Act
(ULSIA)36 with the intention of creating an uncomplicated and unified
method of security realization that is certain and inexpensive.37 The
29. 7 Powell, supranote 13,

938.22[5], at 84D-57 & n.55.

30. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-742 (West 1990); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 559.21 (West 1988 & Supp.
1994).
31. Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. §§ 10-101-10-108 (1988); Md. Rules W70-W72, W77 & W79

(1994).
32. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5313.01(A)-(B) (Anderson 1989).
33. Id. § 5313.07.
34. See supranote 21 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Installment Land Contracts-The National
Scene Revisited, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 30.
36. Unif. Land Security Interest Act, 7A U.L.A. 207 (Supp. 1994).
37. Id. at210.
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ULSIA all but eliminates the differences between security devices,"
allowing realization of a security interest only by judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure.3 9 Although this statute would eliminate forfeiture, it would
provide realization periods for sellers that are as shoit as five weeks.4 °
No state has yet adopted the ULSIA. Several states, however, are either
studying the ULSIA as a possible alternative or are considering sections
of the ULSIA as part of new legislation.
D.

The Real Estate ContractForfeitureAct

Until 1985, when the Washington State Legislature passed the Real
Estate Contract Forfeiture Act (RECFA) to comprehensively govern
forfeitures, courts in Washington turned to the common law42 to deal
with issues arising in real estate contract litigation. The decision to
appoint a committee to draft a statute governing the forfeiture of real
estate contracts came after years of controversy. Probably the most
important concern raised by critics of real estate contracts in Washington
was the potential under the common law for sellers to abuse their
forfeiture rights.43 Two of the main intentions of the :RECFA's drafters
were to advance the public policy of dependable public records and to
define clearly and fairly sellers' and buyers' rights vis-A-vis real estate
contracts.' While the statute proposed by the committee and adopted by
the legislature preserves real estate contract forfeiture ia Washington, 45 it
still contains strict protective procedures that make the remedy less
attractive to sellers.
The RECFA requires that the real estate contract, the notice of intent
to forfeit, and the declaration of forfeiture be recorded :in every county in
which any part of the property is located.4 6 These procedural provisions
are intended to rectify problems caused by sales to bona fide purchasers

38. Id. § 102(b), at 213 & § 111(25),at218.
39. Id. § 507, at 244-46.
40. Id. § 507(b), at 244 & § 509(b), at 247.
41. Norman Geis, The Uniform Land Security InterestAct: Progressand Detours on the Path to
Mortgage Law Reform, Abstracts (Newsl. Am. Real Est. Law., PLACE) Vol. 12 No. 3, Oct. 1994, at
4,6-7.
42. See infra part 1V.A for a discussion of the Washington common law prior to the RECFA.
43. Linda S. Hume, The Washington Real Estate ContractForfeitureAct, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 803,
803-04 (1986).
44. Id. at 804.
45. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.020(1) (1994).
46. Id. §§ 61.30.030(I), 61.30.040(5)-(6).

234

Real Estate Contract Forfeiture
that occur when a party neglects to record a real estate contract or
forfeiture. In addition, the RECFA defines sellers' and buyers' rights by
codifying several aspects of the common law.47 Most importantly, it
continues to allow forfeiture of a buyer's rights.4" The RECFA also
requires that the right to forfeit must be explicitly included in the
contract.49 Like the Washington deed of trust law,50 the seller is not
entitled to any deficiency judgment against the purchaser if the seller
chooses to terminate the contract.5 However, in lieu of forfeiture, the
seller may pursue any other remedies available for default under the
common law or under any other statute. 2
The RECFA combats seller abuse through a combination of
procedural and substantive provisions. In addition to very specific notice
requirements,53 it grants the purchaser and persons owning an interest in
the property a 90-day statutory grace period from the time of notice, in
The
which they may cure the default and reinstate the contract.54
RECFA prevents the acceleration of the contract if the seller wishes to
exercise his forfeiture rights, notwithstanding a clause to that effect in the
contract.5 5 The purchaser or other persons in interest need only pay the
amount in default and any costs the seller incurred by reason of the
default.5 6 In cases of non-monetary default, the purchaser may petition
the court to extend the 90-day period for curing default.57 The purchaser
may also petition the court during this period to bar forfeiture on the
grounds of prior payment, the existence of an offset, or lack of
compliance with the RECFA's provisions.5 8
One of the most important substantive features of the RECFA
provides that the purchaser may force a judicial sale if the value of the
47. Hume, supranote 43, at 806.
48. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.020(l)-(2) (1994).
49. Id. § 61.30.030(2).
50. See supra note 4.
51. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.100(4) (1994).
52- Id. § 61.30.020(1).
53. Id. §§ 61.30.040-080.
54. Id. §§ 61.30.010(10), 61.30.070(l)(e), 61.30.090(2), 61.30.110(3).
55. Id. § 61.30.090(1). The seller still retains the option to accelerate and sue for money judgment
for the full accelerated balance, provided the contract contains art acceleration clause. Id. §
61.30.020(1).
56. Since the amount statutorily required to cure is only the minimum amount necessary to bring
the contract up to date, a buyer is more likely to be able to cure a default and retain the property.
57. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.110(3) (1994).
58. Id.
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property is "substantially" more than the debt. 9 The term "substantial"
is not defined in the statute and has been only minimally explained by
Washington courts.6 Presumably, this provision is inlended to provide
protection for buyers who have built substantial equity in the property
during the contractual relationship. Still, there is no clear statutory
guideline as to how much equity is needed before the buyer can force a
judicial sale.61
The practical application of the RECFA is quite simple. Once the
seller records and delivers notice of intent to forfeit, it is up to the
purchaser either to cure the default, state one of the statutory
exemptions62 from forfeiture, or, if entitled, force a judicial sale63 within
the 90-day period. If the buyer fails to take advantage of these statutory
opportunities, the real estate contract will be terminated and the
purchaser's rights and prior payments and improvements forfeited.'
Strangely, even after the declaration of forfeiture has been filed and
notice of the declaration has been delivered, the purchaser still has 60
days in which to bring an action to set aside the forfeiture.65
The RECFA provides abundant protections to buyers whose property
is subject to forfeiture, while maintaining the real estate contract as an
alternative security device. The RECFA also ensures that the seller's
remedy will not be encroached upon, theoretically preserving a seller's
incentives to sell to less attractive buyers. Unfortunately, despite the
RECFA's benefits, there are indicators that the forfeiture remedy may
have a limited future in the state of Washington.

59. Id. §§ 61.30.120(1) & 61.30.120(3).
60. See infra part VI.B.
61. See infra part VI.B.
62. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.110 (1994).
63. Id. § 61.30.120(3).
64. Id. § 61.30.100.
65. Id. § 61.30.140. The forfeiture will be set aside if the buyer can esta:)lish that the seller was
not entitled to forfeit the contract, or that the seller did not materially comply with the requirements
of the RECFA and the rights of bona fide purchasers for value and encumbrncers for value are not
adversely affected. Id. § 61.30.140(4). Note that these elements are very similar to the elements
required to enjoin forfeiture during the 90-day grace period under § 61.30.110(3). See infra part
VI.A.
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III.

CHALLENGES TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACT FORFEITURE
IN WASHINGTON

A.

Judicial Challenge

The Washington Supreme Court recently handed down an opinion that
indicated a disposition to eliminate the forfeiture remedy. In Tomlinson
v. Clarke," a decision holding that real estate contract buyers can be
"purchasers for value" under the recording act, the court cites an Eastern
District of Washington Bankruptcy Court decision 67 as support for its
determination that Washington law considers the purchaser's interest
under a real estate contract a property interest and the seller's interest a
lien-type security device. 8 Tomlinson states:
We find no relevance in the historical distinction between real
estate contracts and other forms of real property security devices.
There is no valid reason to distinguish between those cases in
which legal title is conveyed to secure the payment of a debt and
those cases in which legal title is retained to secure the payment of
a debt.69
There is an initial question about the force of such a statement, given
the existence of the RECFA, a statute that clearly defines the real estate
contract as a separate form of security device and explicitly permits
forfeiture. The statement was only dictum, far beyond what was
necessary to resolve the questions before the court in Tomlinson.

66. 118 Wash. 2d498, 825 P.2d 706 (1992).
67. Id. at 509, 825 P.2d at 712 (citing In re McDaniel, 89 B.R. 861 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1988), a
bankruptcy case that determined whether a real estate contract is an "executory contract" within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 365). In bankruptcy, a debtor generally has to give a secured creditor the
full value of the creditor's secured interest. Under 11 U.S.C. 365, however, executory contracts can
be assumed or rejected by the bankrupt party. A contract is executory if the obligations of both the
bankrupt and the other party to a contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
the performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance by the other. Depending
on the situation, a debtor may argue that a real estate contract is either a security device or an
executory contract. As a result, bankruptcy courts have often been in a position to decide whether
real estate contracts are security devices. Interestingly, McDaniel is against the weight of authority.
Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Washington Real PropertyDeskbook § 47.48A (Supp. 1989). The debtorvendor's interest is generally treated as an executory contract for purposes of § 365. Id.
68. The Tomlinson court does not rely exclusively on McDaniel. It also cites the Washington
Court of Appeals case Terry v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 655, 604 P.2d 504, 506 (1979), for support
of its position that Washington law considers the purchaser's interest under a real estate contract a
property interest and the seller's interest a lien-type security device. 118 Wash. 2d 498, 509, 825
P.2d 706,712 (1992).
69. Id. at 509-10, 825 P.2d at 712.
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Nevertheless, the dictum demonstrates the court's" disposition to restrict
real estate contracts to the extent it can. The court's language is similar
to that in Sebastian v. Floyd,7 suggesting its desire to do away with
forfeiture.
B.

Statutory Challenge

Another indication of pressure in Washington to abolish the forfeiture
remedy is the Unified Real Property Security Interest Foreclosure Act
(URPSIFA), z a statute proposed by a committee of the Washington Law
Revision Commission to comprehensively alter realization procedures
for all real property security interests. Although the URPSIFA is only in
bill form, and may never become law in Washington, its existence as a
compilation of work and research by experienced professors,
commentators, and attorneys is further evidence of the trend to abolish
real estate contract forfeiture in Washington.
7
The proposed statute would abolish real estate contract forfeitures. 1
Real estate contracts would be governed by the "non-judicial
foreclosure" portion of the proposed statute,74 the provisions of which
would be similar to those in the current deed of trust statute. Under this
provision, most devices could be foreclosed by non-judicial trustee's sale
not less than 190 days after default.75 Real estate contracts and other
purchase money security interests retained by a seller of real property to
secure payment of any portion of the purchase price thereof could be
non-judicially
foreclosed by trustee's sale not less than 120 days after a
76
default.
Except for this difference of 70 days in the realization period, the
commission would treat a real estate contract with a forfeiture provision
like a deed of trust with a power-of-sale clause.77 This would work two
changes in real estate contract realization procedures First, forfeiture
would be replaced by non-judicial foreclosure. Second, the minimum
realization period for non-judicial foreclosure would be 120 days, 30
70. The opinion in Tomlinson was unanimous. Id. at 512, 825 P.2d at 71:.
71. 585 S.W. 2d381 (Ky. 1979).
72. Code ReviserNo. Z-0372.2/95 § 101.
73. Id. § 105(1).
74. Id. §§ 104(11), 104(13), 104(14), 104(15), 105(1), 301. A seller may also choose to judicially
foreclose the real estate contract. Id. §§ 105(1), 201.
75. Id. § 304(6).
76. Id.
77. Id. §§ 105(2), 302, 304(2).
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days longer than the minimum realization period currently required by
the RECFA.
One of the main purposes of the RECFA was to define fairly the rights
of sellers and purchasers under real estate contracts. 8 Although the
committee seems to recognize the need for different treatment of "seller
financed" security interests by imposing a shorter realization period,7 9 the
URPSIFA would nevertheless eliminate the most important equity
balancing factors that are present in the recently-adopted RECFA.
C.

EmpiricalData Forebodesthe Demise of the Real Estate Contract

There are a considerable number of real estate contracts recorded
every year in Washington.80 In fact, real estate contracts are so common
in Washington that they are bought and sold on an active secondary
market.8 ' Even though the widespread use of real estate contracts
continues, available evidence suggests a decrease in their popularity.82

78. Hume, supra note 43, at 804.
79. Code Reviser No. Z-0372.2/95 § 304(6).
80. There were 1187 real estate contracts recorded in 1993 in Spokane County. See infra note
82. In addition, there were 411 real estate contracts recorded in 1993 in King County. Data
collected by author from King County Records office.
81. Many firms even advertise their willingness to buy real estate contracts in telephone
directories. See, e.g., U.S. West Direct, The Yellow Pages, Seattle, pp. 1392-1405 (April
1994/1995); Alliance Mortgage Company, id. at 1394; Guardian Discount Mortgages Inc., id. at
1401; Lakeshore Mortgage Service Inc., id.; and Pacific Coast Investment, id. at 1403.
82. The following data was collected by the author from the Spokane County Auditor's records.
Cited data is in bold-face type.
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TOTAL

TOTAL

DEEDS
OF TRUST

1993

34,311

1,187

35,498

96.66%

3.34%

3.46%

1992

26,746

1,375

28,121

95.11%

4.89%

5.14%

1991

17,889

1,272

19,161

93.36%

6.64%

7.11%

1990

15,277

1,284

16,561

92.25%

7.75%

8.40%

1989

12,202

933

13,135

92.90%

7.10%

7.65%

1988

11,122

951

12,073

92.12%

7.88%

8.55%

1987

13,985

862

14,847

94.19%

5.81%

6.16%
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Despite the fact that the RECFA mandates document recordation,83 the
percentage of real estate contract recordings relative to deeds of trusts
has dropped markedly since the RECFA was drafted. In Spokane
County in 1977, when common law governed real estate contracts in
Washington, 2,642 real estate contracts and 12,949 deeds of trust were
recorded. In 1993, by contrast, there were 1,187 real estate contracts and
34,311 deeds of trust recorded in Spokane County. Much of this decline
in real estate contract usage occurred between 1984 and 1987, when the
public became aware of the RECFA. In fact, real estate contracts as a
percentage of deeds of trust dropped from 14.28% to 6.16% in that fouryear time span.
This drop is not so surprising when one considers the uncertainty that
must have resulted from a new law that altered the traditional balance of
equities. Surely sellers were less willing than before fae adoption of the
RECFA to finance a real property sale. The RECFA increased the
minimum realization period and entitled the buyers, in some situations,
to force a judicial foreclosure in lieu of forfeiture. It is improbable that
other variables, particularly the high interest rates of the mid-eighties,
account for this sudden and substantial drop in the use of real estate
contracts. The continuing lower usage of real estate contracts that has
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TOTAL

TOTAL

TOTAL

DEEDS
OF TRUST

1986

16,025

885

16,910

94.77%

5.23%

5.52%

1985

12,590

1,220

13,810

91.17%

8.83%

9.69%

1984

11,068

1,580

12,648

87.51%

12.49%

14.28%

1983

10,784

1,790

12,574

85.76%

14.24%

16.60%

1982

7131

1,705

8836

80.70%

19.30%

23.91%

1981

7389

2,458

9847

75.04%

24.96%

33.27%

1980

7813

2,772

10,585

73.81%

26.19%

35.48%

1979

12,040

2,803

14,843

81.12%

18.88%

23.28%

1978

14,003

2,785

16,788

83.41%

16.59%

19.89%

1977

12,949

2,642

15,591

83.05%

16.95%

20.40%

83. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.030(1) (1994).
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occurred since this drop excludes interest rates and other fluctuating
variables as causes of the drop in usage.
This section is not intended to challenge the balance of equities
achieved by the RECFA for buyers and sellers under real estate
contracts. Rather, it is intended to forebode the decrease in real estate
contracts that would occur upon eliminating forfeiture entirely. As a
result of the RECFA, real estate contracts in Washington are already less
attractive to sellers than they were before. Abolishing forfeiture would
virtually eliminate their use.
IV. LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY REASONS FOR
ENFORCING FORFEITURE PROVISIONS
The main argument for abolishing real estate contract forfeitures is
that a real estate contract simply serves the same function as a purchase
money mortgage; hence, the realization procedures for real estate
contracts should be the same as those for mortgages." However, this
reasoning is fundamentally flawed in its assumption that foreclosure is
the proper method of security realization. A similar argument could be
made that, since a purchase money mortgage serves the same purpose as
a real estate contract, it should be forfeited as a contract.
The Washington Supreme Court in Tomlinson seems to agree with this
flawed reasoning without directly addressing the question of forfeiture.
Its statement that "there is no relevance in the historical distinction
between real estate contracts and other forms of real property security
devices"85 evinces its attitude, which suggests little respect for the
historical or contemporary value of the real estate contract and its
inextricably intertwined forfeiture remedy.
The forfeiture remedy is not a completely separate component of the
real estate contract. The historical development of a contractual
alternative to mortgage financing produced a quick and efficient
forfeiture remedy as an inseparable feature of the real estate contract.
Many of the factors that made this distinct remedy historically relevant
are still relevant today, bolstered by new social and economic factors that
make the continued viability of forfeiture even more important.

84. See, e.g., Nelson & Whitman, supranote 1, § 3.29 at 86-87.
85. Tomlinson v. Clarke, 118 Wash. 2d 498, 509, 825 P.2d 706, 712 (1992).
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The Legal Basisfor EnforcingReal Estate ContractForfeitures

A.

Real estate contract forfeiture clauses have been enforced throughout
Washington's history. It can be argued that early Washington decisions
allowed forfeitures based on the concept that the buye: had no legal or
equitable interest in the real property. If a buyer had no real property
interest, it logically followed that what was forfeited was only the
buyer's contractual rights. Indeed, the question of a buyer's interest
under a real estate contract has been a lively topic: throughout the
twentieth century. 86 The extent of a buyer's interest, however, has not
been the focus of courts that have enforced forfeiture provisions.
Courts in Washington have been aware of the similarity of real estate
contracts and equitable mortgages since the latter part of the nineteenth
century. In St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber v. Bolton,87 a case that involved
what the court called a bond for deed, the court stated, "[t]here can be no
sensible distinction between the case of a legal title conveyed to secure
the payment of a debt and a legal title retained to secure payment. '88 The
parties in St. Paul,however, never agreed to a forfeiture remedy in the
event of a default. In fact, the same judges who decided St. Paul
enforced a contractual forfeiture clause less than two years later in Pease
v. Baxter.89 In that case, the court grappled strenuously with the property
interest question, finally allowing forfeiture by focusing on the fact that
the transaction involved the sale of real estate and not merely a loan with
property taken as security. 90
Washington courts have also shown a consistent willingness to focus
on the validity of the bargaining process rather than on any technical
86. See, e.g., P. John Liehty, Rights and Estates of Vendor and Vendee Under an Executory
Contractfor the Sale of Real Property, 1 Wash. L. Rev. 9 (1925); Alfred J.Schweppe, Rights of a
Vendee Under an Executory Forfeitable Contractfor the PurchaseofReal ,state: A FurtherWord
on the Washington Law, 2 Wash. L. Rev. I(1926); Stuart G. Oles, Comment The Vendor-Purchaser
Relationship in Washington, 22 Wash. L. Rev. 110 (1947); Linda S.Hume, Real Estate Contracts
and the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion in Washington: Dispellingthe Ashford Cloud, 7 U. Puget
Sound L. Rev. 233 (1984). Prior to 1977, Washington courts held many times that a buyer under a
real estate contract had rights totally inconsistent with the concept that a buyer has no title or
interest, legal or equitable, in property subject to a real estate contract. Cascade Security Bank v.
Butler, 88 Wash. 2d 777, 782, 567 P.2d 631, 633 (1977). In Cascade Security Bank v. Butler, the
Washington State Supreme Court held "specifically" that a real estate contract buyer has a "real
estate" interest after analyzing prior Washington case law. Id. at 782, 567 P.2d at 634. The Cascade
court arguably did nothing more than recognize the doctrine as developed in dihese prior cases.
87. 5 Wash. 763, 32 P. 787 (1893).
88. Id. at 766, 32 P. at 788.
89. 12 Wash. 567,41 P. 899 (1895).
90. Id. at 573, 41 P. at 900-01.
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distinction involving the parties' real property interests. 9' This
willingness shows a judicial attitude that parties can reach an effective
and equitable agreement on their own. Under the common law, when the
enforcement of a particular forfeiture was directly at issue, the focus was
not on whether the contractual forfeiture clause should be declared void
but on whether conditions should equitably be imposed before it was
enforced. Courts generally dealt with any perceived harshness of the
remedy not by disallowing forfeiture, but by allowing an equitable grace
period in which the buyer could cure the default. 92 This suggests that
courts of common law and equity presupposed the validity and the
necessity of forfeiture provisions, regarding forfeiture as not merely a
remedy, but as an invaluable and indispensable part of the real estate
contract.
B.

The Economic Basisfor Real Estate ContractForfeiture

Historically, third-party loans for property purchases were not
available in certain markets even to credit-worthy individuals. 93 Many
sellers had no alternative to financing transactions with buyers
themselves. Since the seller was both conveyor and financier of the
property, the contractual agreements regarding conveyance and financing
were often contained in a single document: the real estate contract. This
arrangement was not only convenient but also crucial to the seller.
Because financing was not by mortgage but by contract, the seller was
able to avoid the uncertainty and burdens associated with traditional
foreclosure. The seller could instead proceed with a simple forfeiture,
which at most imposed a short grace period for the buyer to pay the
balance of the loan and protect his property from forfeiture.
In the modem economic environment, where a security-backed
mortgage or deed of trust is immediately marketable, third-party
91. See, e.g., Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wash. 2d 246, 252, 173 P.2d 977, 979-80 (1946); Sleeper v.
Bragdon, 45 Wash. 562, 567-68, 88 P. 1036, 1038 (1907) (stating that legal contracts will be
enforced as made and in accordance with the acts of the parties thereunder); Drown v. Ingels, 3
Wash. 424, 428, 28 P. 759, 760 (1892) (recognizing that the hardship of any case will not justify a
court in setting aside the solemn agreement of the parties); Chambers v. Cranston, 16 Wash. App.
543, 545, 558 P.2d 271,273 (1976).
92. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
93. There are many plausible explanations for this situation. For example, there may have been
few or no institutional lenders in many rural counties and smaller towns, resulting in a lack of
competition and prohibitive rates. In addition, lenders may have been unwilling to lend in many
areas due to inadequacy of title information. Lending in remote areas also may have been
prohibitive due to high administrative costs.
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financing is more readily available. Moreover, parties to a real estate
sale and purchase usually prefer to finance with third-party funds
because the benefits of such financing are numerous. a explanation of
those benefits is pertinent to a discussion about forfeiture because it
clarifies the risks of engaging in seller financing.
Third-party financing is important for sellers because individual
sellers are generally not in the business of financing real estate
transactions. Financing an individual sale of property is a burden to most
sellers because, unlike a bank or other lending institution, an individual
seller presumably has neither a risk-spreading portfolio of property loans
nor the resources to administer a loan efficiently. In addition, since the
need for liquidity and investment flexibility is met by cash, sellers who
have a choice logically elect to receive cash on the closing of a real estate
transaction.
Buyers also benefit greatly from third-party financing. While buyers
who qualify for third-party lending will generally have to pay more in
transaction costs,94 the loan terms and interest rate flom a third-party
lender may be so superior to the terms and rate under a real estate
contract that the long-term costs of the debt are substanially lower. Due
to the protections built into the loan application process, it is especially
beneficial for unsophisticated buyers to utilize third-party financing.95
Despite the modem market in mortgage-backed securities, a buyer is
not always able to obtain third-party financing for a variety of reasons.
First, the buyer may not have the substantial down payment required by a
third-party lender.96 Second, the buyer's income stream may be such that
a high risk exists for default on the loan. Third, the property the buyer
offers as security may be in a high-risk category, either because of its
intended use or because of its physical condition. These risk factors tend

94. For a comparison of transactional costs between deed of trust financing and real estate
contract financing, see John Mixon, Installment Land Contracts: A Study of Low Income
Transactions, With Proposalsfor Reform and a New Program to Provide Home Ownership in the
Inner City, 7 Hous. L. Rev. 523, 530-35 (1970).
95. The typical Federal Housing Administration loan requires that the parties to the loan obtain an
appraisal of the property, title insurance, recordation of the deed, mortgage insurance, and hazard
insurance. Id. at 530. These requirements ensure that the property meet; minimum construction
requirements, that there will be a much lower possibility of title disputes, and that the loan will be
paid back in spite of unforeseen problems.
96. Id. at 526 (it is the rare low income buyer who can come up with sub,;tantial down payments).
See also 7 Powell, supra note 13, 938.20[2], at 84D-6 (stating that a purchaser benefits from
installment land contracts through a low down payment and through the opportunity to buy without
satisfying stringent mortgage credit requirements).
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to be more significant in times of economic prosperity.' Finally, the real
estate market may be such that no buyers qualified for third-party
financing come forward during the time in which the seller wishes to sell
a piece of property. If so, the seller's only alternative is to finance the
transaction, leaving neither the seller nor the buyer able to benefit from
the normal third-party financing advantages, but leaving both with
distinct needs.
Sellers financing sales to under-qualified buyers need to cover the post
of the incurred risks. They may do this by requiring a higher down
payment, a higher interest rate, a higher purchase price, a quick and
efficient remedy in case of default, or a combination of these features.
The most important needs of the typical buyer, on the other hand, are for
a low down payment, minimal transaction costs, clear property title, and
a fair method for realizing any substantial equity in the property in case
of default.
When the buyer does not qualify for third-party financing, a seller can
finance the sale either through a mortgage, a deed of trust, or a real estate
contract. In most cases, the only two techniques that help the seller
prevent loss, as distinct from compensating for risk, are a high down
payment and a right to realize the security upon default quickly and
efficiently. Because a high down payment is one of the main barriers
that keeps a buyer from obtaining third-party financing in the first
place,98 a seller who requires a high down payment reduces the market.
Moreover, since risk of default is high and the seller wishes to avoid a
costly and time-consuming realization process upon default, a mortgage
or deed of trust is not attractive. The quick and efficient forfeiture
remedy of real estate contracts is the only adequate risk-lowering
alternative in most seller financing situations.

97. "In prosperous times when the economy is growing and there are numerous competitive
sources seeking the available capital, the money market becomes restrictive and permits commercial
lenders to become more selective in the terms on which they are willing to invest their funds."
Garrett Power, Land ContractsasSecurity Devices, 12 Wayne L. Rev. 391, 395 (1966).
98. When the initial loan-to-value ratio is high, it is more likely that the value of the property may
be less than the value of the loan at a subsequent date. Robert J. Aalberts & Terrence M. Clauretie,
The Impact of Legal Costs in the Default-ForeclosureProcess of Residential Mortgages,25 Am.
Bus. L.J. 571,576 (1988). Mortgagors are more likely to default when the value of the property falls
below the loan balance. Id. Thus, banks generally prefer to require down payments high enough to
substantially decrease the initial loan-to-value ratio.
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The PolicyBasisfor EnforcingForfeitures: The Goal of Home
Ownership

The diminishing use of real estate contracts is not consistent with the
public policy to encourage home ownership.9 9 By its nature, the real
estate contract is used in that part of the real estate sales market that is
unattractive to third-party lenders because of high lDan risks. The
inability of a person in that market segment to make a substantial down
payment is a risk factor that has become increasingly commonplace as
real estate prices have risen faster than salaries. Since seller financing is
such an individualized type of lending, a seller is able to assess the
required down payment on a personal level. The seller can usually make
a personal determination of the character of the buyer and may sense a
special level of "owner psychology"'" that decreases the need for a
substantial down payment. At any rate, sellers need not demand the
higher down payments required by third-party lenders because, unlike
third-party lenders, they do not have to sell the property to realize their
01
security.
Some commentators argue that real estate contracts can facilitate
housing transactions for low-income buyers.0 2 In fact, in Washington,
real estate contracts are often used for financing residential property
sales. Since real estate contracts in Washington finance the sale of
residential property to parties who cannot obtain third-party lending, the
real estate contract promotes the public policy in favor of home
ownership. Abolishing the forfeiture remedy would virtially end the use
of real estate contracts, thus denying home ownership to some lowincome persons who now enjoy ownership and tending to defeat the
public policy in favor of home ownership.

99. See, e.g., Clark v. Davis, 37 Wash. 2d 850, 852, 226 P.2d 904, 905 (1951) (recognizing that
home ownership inculcates independence, protects society from its citizens becoming paupers, and
promotes the stability and welfare of the state).
100. See Mixon, supra note 94, at 553 (arguing that a person who buys a house will tend to take
care of it, repair it, and spend considerable sums improving it).
101. Third-party lenders in Washington generally use deeds of trust which require a public sale of
the property by a trustee to realize the security upon default. See supranote 3.
102. See, e.g., Mixon, supra note 94, at 555 (arguing that the real estate contract has great
potential to streamline housing transactions, as long as it insures protection for buyers); Eric T.
Freyfogle, The InstallmentLand Contract as Lease: Habitability Protection and the Low Income
Purchaser,62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 293, 304-05 (1987) (stating that real estate contracts are appealing to
purchasers with little equity to invest in a home).
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VI. AMENDING THE RECFA
There are several reasons for the wide use of real estate contracts
despite the protections the RECFA provides buyers. First, the statute
balances and protects the basic interests of both buyers and sellers.
Second, the seller's remedies in the RECFA have short enough
realization periods"°3 to induce sellers to use real estate contracts.1°4
Finally, the recording requirements of the RECFA yield more stable
titles than under the common law, making real estate contracts more
likely to be covered by title insurance policies. The certainty of an
insurable title after forfeiture increases the attractiveness of the forfeiture
remedy.
The legislature can achieve more certainty in the forfeiture process
without tilting the balance of RECFA in favor of either buyers or sellers.
Increasing certainty would cause growth in the usage rate of real estate
contracts, thus expanding the availability of credit for lower income
buyers. Two specific and simple changes in the RECFA would preserve
the equities between buyers and sellers, while at the same time increasing
the certainty of the realization process.
A.

EliminatingProceduralRedundancy

The legislature should eliminate the 60-day period to bring an action
to set aside forfeiture under the Revised Code of Washington section
61.30.140. The only statutory bases for bringing such an action are that
the seller either did not comply with the provisions of the RECFA or was
not entitled to forfeit the contract.'0 5 Both of these factors are bases for a
claim in the original 90-day notice period.1 6 This redundancy is
unnecessary and augments the inefficiency of the realization process.
The 90-day notice period is more than adequate to allow the buyer to
protect his interest. Allowing a buyer to bring an action for claims he
neglected to bring in the 90-day notice period for 60 days afterforfeiture
becomes final is unfair to the seller. Furthermore, it clouds the seller's
remedy because he can never be certain until the 60-day post-forfeiture
period has passed that he has acquired the full right to the property. This
103. Deed of trust foreclosure takes at least 190 days. See supra note 4. Real estate contract
forfeiture can take as little as 90 days. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.070(l)(e) (1994).
104. See Power, supranote 97, at 401.
105. Wash. Rev. Code § 61.30.140(4) (1994).
106. Id. § 61.30.110(3).
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makes forfeiture under the RECFA a less predictable process that, in
turn, makes would-be vendors less likely to sell to higher-risk buyers.
B.

Rethinking the "Substantial"Equity Test

The RECFA makes an attempt to eliminate the perceived harshness
from forfeiture by giving the buyer the ability to force a judicial sale of
the property when "the court finds the then fair market value of the
property §ubstantially exceeds the unpaid and unperfo:rmed obligations
secured by the contract."10 7 Unfortunately, the ambiguity of this
provision introduces uncertainty to forfeiture, making a seller less likely
to finance a sale. Powell v. Rinne,0 8 a case in which the Washington
Court of Appeals determined that the legislature intended a court to order
a judicial sale of the property only when there would be a "significant
benefit"'0 9 to the purchaser, exemplifies this uncertainty. The court
determined that a property value twenty percent in excess of the
outstanding obligations did not provide a sufficient cushion to warrant a
public sale."0 Unfortunately, the court's displeasure with the plaintiffs
payment record, his failure to pay real estate taxes, and his previous
attempts to evade forfeiture obscure the court's rational. in reaching the
decision."' It is difficult to determine whether the court's conclusions
regarding substantiality would have been the same had the plaintiff not
had such a poor record. Further clouding this provision of the RECFA is
the court's insistence that the trial court had the discretion to refuse to
order a sale even if it concluded that the value of the property
substantially exceeded the obligations."
Again, whether the court
would have exercised this discretion in the case of a more sympathetic
plaintiff is unclear.
1.

The Percentage-of-Purchase-Price
Test

The legislature should amend the RECFA to define precisely the point
at which a buyer earns the right to force a sale of property. A buyer in
default should be allowed to force a sale only when he has paid 25% of

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. § 61.30.120(3).
71 Wash. App. 297, 857 P.2d 1090 (1993).
Id. at 302, 857 P.2d at 1093.
Id. at 303, 857 P.2d at 1093.

111. Id., 857 P.2d at 1094.
112. Id.
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the purchase price of a home in which he lives, or 40% of the purchase
price of any other real property. This objective test relies on measurable
standards that have a realistic basis. The typical down payment required
by a bank for a home loan to a credit-worthy individual is 10%."' The
typical down payment required by a bank for an investment property
loan to a credit-worthy individual is 25%."' As the use of a real estate
contract generally indicates the presence of higher risk factors and the
absence of traditional financing, it is only fair that a buyer under a real
estate contract be required to pay a higher percentage of the purchase
price before he can realize the benefits of a traditional remedy. A 15%
premium is more than reasonable, considering the added risk a seller
incurs in financing a sale.
This percentage-of-purchase-price test places the burden on the buyer
to protect his interest. The more the property has increased in value, the
more incentive the buyer will have to pay his obligations as they become
due. This burden is balanced by the fact that a seller and buyer know
exactly when the buyer can force a public sale of the property, increasing
the buyer's leverage when the amount paid on the contract reaches the
appropriate percentage. The pressure of forfeiture provides the impetus
for a buyer to pay the arrearages, or to arrange for an independent sale or
substitute financing.' The pressure of a forced public sale provides the
impetus for a seller to negotiate with the buyer to avoid foreclosure.
The percentage-of-purchase-price test also eliminates costly court
battles over the market value of the property. Sellers and buyers avoid
expensive appraisal fees and exorbitant attorney fees. These high costs
can force the average low-income buyer to relinquish his rights after a
default, even when there is substantial equity in the property. They can
also deter potential seller-financiers from ever placing their properties on
the market in the first place.
2.

Allowing Non-JudicialForeclosure

The RECFA should further be amended to provide that a buyer in
default can demand a non-judicial foreclosure sale by the seller's

113. See, e.g., Washington Mutual Savings Bank marketing literature (notes on file with the
Washington Law Review).
114. Id.
115. If the value of the property has increased, a buyer should generally be able to protect a large
percentage of the accrued equity in the property through an independent sale or substitute financing.
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appointee116 when a buyer has met the percentage-of-purchase-price test
as previously defined. Judicial involvement would occur only if a seller
opposes this demand. The percentage-of-purchase-price test is such a
precise standard that a seller would have no reason to oppose the sale
unless the buyer had not in fact met the obligations of the contract.
The rationale for allowing non-judicial rather than judicial foreclosure
is that most traditional financing in Washington is carried out using
deeds of trust.' i Given this fact, even if a buyer would have qualified
for traditional financing at the outset, the buyer would generally not be
entitled to anything more protective than non-judicial foreclosure. It is
not fair to the seller to give a buyer the right to judicial foreclosure after
earning the right to be treated like an average credil risk through the
percentage-of-purchase-price test.
Judicial foreclosure is also impractical. The eight-month to one-year
redemption period" 8 it provides is wholly at odds with the RECFA's
goal of providing a fair and efficient remedy for buyers and sellers under
real estate contracts. The uncertainty judicial foreclostxe introduces into
the remedy is completely unacceptable for sellers who wish to know
ahead of time when they will be able to realize their security in event of
default.
VII. CONCLUSION
The real estate contract is the security device used in thousands of real
property sales each year in Washington. Because it allows forfeiture, the
real estate contract provides the least costly and time-consuming remedy
and is thus best able to serve the vital function of seller financing. The
pressure to abolish forfeiture is based on the flawed premise that
foreclosure is a superior remedy to forfeiture. In reality, the RECFA
provides an excellent alternative remedy in situations where sellers have
no other choice than to finance sales of property themselves. With the
amendments proposed in this Comment, the RECFA reasonably protects
both buyers and sellers while promoting the public policy in favor of
home ownership.
Legislators in many states will have to decide whether to adopt
comprehensive laws governing realization of all real property security
116. Allowing non-judicial foreclosure of a real estate contract instead ofjudicial foreclosure is a
concept incorporated in the proposed URPSIFA. Code Reviser No. Z-0372.:295 §§ 105(1), 301.
117. See supranote 82.
118. See supranote 2.
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interests. These legislators should carefully consider the usefulness of
forfeiture in seller-financing situations and work to incorporate forfeiture
into comprehensive laws, thereby preserving the real estate contract as an
alternative to the mortgage and deed of trust.

